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Regarding as the derivative production in capital market, anti-takeover not only 
impulses the effective disposition of economic resources, but also causes the battle of 
the company's control. In the battle, the director of targeted company faces some 
threat such as drop of earning or losing of status, so it is very possible for them to 
harm the interests of company because of self-protecting. At present, the relevant 
legislation is relative lagging in our country, and the system of anti-takeover is not set 
up totally. These aggravate the reduction crisis of fiduciary duty of the director of 
targeted company. Then how to guarantee the rational fulfillment of the fiduciary duty 
of the director in the anti-takeover, so as to improve the reasonable operation of 
modern company has become an unavoidable problem in the company operation. By 
analyzing the legislation of foreign countries and the reform of stock right in China, 
the author tries to figure out the legislative trend embodied in the revision of Chinese 
Company Law and Securities Law, and suggest reasonable legal system for the 
improvement of the fiduciary duty of director.  
The thesis consists of three parts——preface, text and conclusion. The text 
covers five chapters:  
Chapter one explains the appearance of a lot of interests conflict in anti-takeover 
according to the theory of takeover and anti-takeover. Meanwhile, the author points 
out that it is an important proposition in the legislation of anti-takeover to strengthen 
director's fiduciary duty according to combining the origin and development of 
fiduciary duty.  
Chapter two describes the value of strengthening fiduciary duty of director of 
targeted company from the point of view of economy and law. And the author points 
out that it is primary aim to balance the interests between the relevant subjects. At the 
same time, it accords with the inherent requirements of modern corporate.  
Chapter three analyzes some foreign legislative restraint of fiduciary duty of 
director in anti-takeover. Such as the general permission model represented by the 
United States of America, and the general prohibition model represented by Britain 
and Germany. The author analyzes the function of director's fiduciary duty under the 














two kinds of models.  
Chapter four focuses on the current situation in our country. The author analyzes 
some blank in legal system and suggests the prerequisite of director’s fiduciary duty, 
through the analysis of the transition of the director’s function in our country and the 
current relevant legislation. 
Chapter five mainly proposes several legal systems to strengthen the fiduciary 
duty of director of targeted company in China. The author suggests that it improves 
relevant legislation and it can ensure that director's fiduciary duty would be fulfilled 
totally, through the function of company inside-control and outside-control system by 
following the principle of encouragement and restraint.  
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购方式往往会得到目标公司管理层的同意；要约收购指收购者通过某种方式，公
开向目标公司的股东发出要约，收购一定数量目标公司的股权，从而达到控制该
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